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In recent years, concerns have been raised over the
ability of multilateral environmental agreements to
effectively coordinate their policies and activities on
issues of mutual interest. This article examines the
current initiatives pursued by the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) to
synergize its activities for the conservation of biodiver-
sity with allied regimes. It examines cooperative poli-
cies undertaken alongside the two key biodiversity
treaties with which CITES operates most closely –
namely the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
and the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals. The article out-
lines broad thematic and species-specific interactions,
suggesting that while there is considerable scope to
develop cooperative working practices, a degree of
caution is appropriate as to the current level of prior-
ity placed upon synergies between these regimes as a
solution to operative challenges.
INTRODUCTION
In the forty years since the conclusion of the 1973 Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),1 multilateral regimes
with an application to threatened biodiversity have
steadily proliferated. Although this development ought
to be considered highly encouraging, indicative of a
maturation of international environmental law gener-
ally and a clear global interest in the plight of imperilled
species specifically, concerns have nonetheless arisen
over the practical coordination of this sprawling
network of actors and instruments. In particular, reser-
vations have long been expressed over the perils of
so-called ‘treaty congestion’,2 where poor inter-regime
cooperation may generate competing and potentially
conflicting conservation priorities, alongside adminis-
trative and managerial duplication, inconsistencies and
wastage.
The continued preference for autonomous multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) as the modern
regulatory model of choice3 has rendered international
efforts to regulate particular species a deceptively com-
plicated and, arguably, counter-productive affair.4
Increasingly, a core task of multilateral biodiversity
management has involved marshalling the interrela-
tionship between MEAs to facilitate uniform and
complementary conservation strategies.5 To take a
practical example, the regulation of a single species
such as the iconic blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus)
currently categorized as ‘endangered’,6 requires the
coordination of a disparate mosaic of multilateral
bodies. As a (previously) commercially hunted species
it is governed by the 1946 International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)7 and is thereby
subject to managerial oversight by the International
Whaling Commission (IWC). Additionally, as a migra-
tory species, blue whales have long been listed on the
Appendices of the Convention on the 1979 Conserva-
tion of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)8 and
are subject to particular measures to address impedi-
ments to migration and rehabilitate wild stocks and
habitat ranges. As a species considered vulnerable to
the adverse impacts of international trade it has also
been listed on the Appendices to CITES and is thereby
subject to protective trade policies. More recently, the
1 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Wash-
ington, DC, 3 March 1973; in force 1 July 1975) (‘CITES’).
2 See especially E. Brown Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law:
Contemporary Issues and The Emergence of a New World Order’,
81:3 Georgetown Law Journal (1993), 675; and B.L. Hicks, ‘Treaty
Congestion in International Environmental Law: The Need for Greater
International Coordination’, 32:5 University of Richmond Law Review
(1999), 1643.
3 On the emergence of such regimes and the legal issues raised
thereby, see R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional
Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-
noticed Phenomenon in International Law’, 94:4 American Journal of
International Law (2000), 623.
4 For a searching critique of the fragmented status quo, see A.
Jóhannsdóttir, I. Cresswell and P. Bridgewater, ‘The Current Frame-
work for International Governance of Biodiversity: Is it Doing More
Harm than Good?’, 19:2 Review of European Community and Inter-
national Environmental Law (2010), 139. For a more cautiously opti-
mistic prognosis of the current status of inter-treaty coordination, see
R. Caddell, ‘The Integration of Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments: Lessons from the Biodiversity-related Conventions’, 22:1
Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2011), 37.
5 See R. Caddell, n. 4 above, at 39–48.
6 As designated on the current version of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species. See
<http://www.iucnredlist.org>.
7 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Washing-
ton, DC, 2 December 1946; in force 11 October 1948).
8 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals (Bonn, 23 June 1979; in force 1 November 1983) (‘CMS’).
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1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)9 has
substantially expanded its marine programme, with
further regulatory implications for blue whales. In addi-
tion to these prominent global instruments, regional
agreements will also be highly relevant, including the
Antarctic regime10 and CMS subsidiaries addressing
southern Europe11 and the Pacific region.12 Further-
more, blue whales face particular conservation threats
that fall under the purview of other regimes. By-catches
are considered to be an especially pernicious hazard to
cetaceans;13 managerial coordination with a plethora of
fisheries management organizations is therefore a vital
conservation strategy. Likewise, engagement with a
multitude of pollution control bodies will be required to
improve habitat quality. Meanwhile, the management
of international shipping activities – such as the miti-
gation of anthropogenic noise14 and the proactive
reduction of vessel-strike mortality15 – will also play a
key role, necessitating a mutually supportive working
relationship with the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO). Multilateral efforts to actively conserve an
individual species – whether marine, terrestrial or
avian – accordingly involve a significant operational
undertaking.
Against this backdrop, and with CITES presently exer-
cising responsibility over almost 35,000 individual
species of flora and fauna, effective coordination with
allied MEAs constitutes a significant institutional
priority. Indeed, at the recent Rio+20 Conference
in 2012, the international community formally
acknowledged
the important role of the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, an interna-
tional agreement that stands at the intersection between
trade, the environment and development, promotes the con-
servation and sustainable use of biodiversity, should con-
tribute to tangible benefits for local people, and ensures that
no species entering into international trade is threatened
with extinction. . . . In this regard, we emphasize the
importance of effective international cooperation among
relevant multilateral environmental agreements and inter-
national organizations.16
Institutional synergies are frequently championed as a
means of improving the performance of MEAs, yet the
operational effectiveness of inter-treaty collaborations
remains decidedly under-assessed. Although prosaic,
the integrative practices of such bodies nonetheless
remain quietly significant,17 and offer important
lessons in modern regime interaction.18 Under pres-
sure to achieve substantially more with considerably
less, and with performance and wastage fastidiously
audited, MEAs are becoming increasingly obliged to
integrate and align their activities further – a trend
that has implications both for individual regimes
and for the future of international environmental
governance.19 This article accordingly examines the
current state of cooperation between CITES and two
leading MEAs for the conservation of biodiversity –
namely the CBD and the CMS. It first appraises the
cooperative models adopted by CITES in addressing
inter-treaty liaison, before considering the thematic
and executive synergies developed with the CBD to
address overlapping issues of concern. Finally, it
evaluates collaborative activities with the CMS, with
which CITES arguably maintains the greatest scope
for interaction due to the number of overlapp-
ing species regulated under the umbrella of both
regimes.
9 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992; in
force 29 December 1993) (‘CBD’).
10 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (Canberra, 20 May 1980; in force 7 April 1982). Under
Article VI of the Convention, regulatory authority over Antarctic whale
stocks is expressly deferred to the IWC, although the Commission for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
does exercise oversight over krill, the staple prey of the blue whale.
CITES interests in Antarctic whales have been increasingly engaged
in recent years. See P.H. Sand, ‘Japan’s “Research Whaling” in the
Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean in the Face of
the Endangered Species Convention (CITES)’, 17:1 Review of Euro-
pean Community and International Environmental Law (2008), 56.
11 Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea,
Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (Monaco, 24
November 1996; in force 1 June 2001) (‘ACCOBAMS’).
12 Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of Cetaceans
and Their Habitats in the Pacific Islands Region (Noumea, 15 Sep-
tember 2006; in force 15 September 2006).
13 A.J. Reid, ‘The Looming Crisis: Interactions between Marine
Mammals and Fisheries’, 89:3 Journal of Mammalogy (2008), 541.
14 On this issue, see A. Gillespie, ‘Noise Pollution, The Oceans and
the Limits of International Law’, 21:1 Yearbook of International Envi-
ronmental Law (2010), 114.
15 On current International Maritime Organization (IMO) policies in
this regard, see R. Caddell, ‘Shipping and the Conservation of Marine
Biodiversity: Legal Responses to Vessel-strikes of Marine Mammals’,
in: R. Caddell and D.R. Thomas (eds.), Shipping, Law and the Marine
Environment in the Twenty-first Century (Lawtext, 2013), 86, at
95–114.
16 The Future We Want (UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, 11 September
2012), at paragraph 203 (emphasis added).
17 For an illuminating account of the legal difficulties concerning the
operational powers of MEA institutions, see B.H. Desai, Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: Legal Status of the Secretariats
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 133–170.
18 On the importance of such case studies, see M.A. Young,
‘Regime Interaction in Creating, Implementing and Enforcing Inter-
national Law’, in: M.A. Young, Regime Interaction in International
Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press, 2012),
85.
19 Following its ‘Future Shape’ deliberations the CMS considers that
closer coordination with other regimes and resource sharing will be
vital to its future activities, while the amalgamation of the core
biodiversity treaties within the CBD is also advocated. See A.
Jóhannsdóttir, I. Cresswell and P. Bridgewater, n. 4 above, at
147–149. The so-called ‘chemical cluster’ of treaties is undertaking
a process of administrative and executive fusion, although this
remains at an early stage. See R. Caddell, n. 4 above, at 60–61.
Commentators have nonetheless warned that linkages are not
a panacea against the current challenges facing biodiversity
MEAs. See A. Long, ‘Developing Linkages to Preserve Biodiver-
sity’, 21:1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2010),
41.
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CITES AND THE SCOPE FOR
INTER-TREATY COOPERATION
The elaboration of a unique regime straddling the
boundaries of international trade and environmental
protection was initially mandated by the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1963.
Further impetus towards this broad objective was gen-
erated at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (UNCHE), where the Stockholm
Action Plan called for the development of a convention
‘on export, import and transit of certain species of wild
animals and wild plants’.20 Concluded in 1973, CITES
has since become one of the most widely-ratified MEAs
to date, with 178 current parties.21
CITES is a member of the so-called ‘Biodiversity-
related Conventions’ – a cluster of six core treaties with
an application to global nature conservation.22 Unlike
many of these regimes, however, CITES represents a
more specialized forum for biodiversity management,
maintaining an exclusive focus on international trade.
It is therefore not designed to provide a holistic frame-
work to address the myriad threats to vulnerable
species. Nevertheless, there is copious recognition
within its policies towards individual species that these
broad themes are not mutually exclusive and that trade
restrictions may become necessary due in large part to
wider environmental factors. Accordingly, as noted
below, the CITES parties and institutions maintain a
keen interest in regimes that seek to provide a broader
habitat-based approach to species management.
Thematically, CITES applies solely to ‘international’
trade; internal trade is accordingly a matter exclusively
for domestic law or, alternatively, for a union or
regional trade agreement affecting customs boundar-
ies.23 As observed below, this restriction in scope has
had an influence on collaborative practices with
particular regimes involving common parties within
which the trade in mutual species is strictly municipal.
Like many other nature conservation regimes, CITES
operates a listing approach, classifying species accord-
ing to the exigency of their conservation status and pre-
scribing a sliding scale of commitments accordingly.
Under Article II.1, Appendix I includes all species
threatened with extinction which are or may be threat-
ened by trade. Trade in these species is subject to ‘par-
ticularly strict regulation in order not to endanger
further their survival and must only be authorised in
exceptional circumstances’. Appendix II addresses all
species which ‘although not necessarily threatened with
extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of
such species is subject to strict regulation in order to
avoid utilisation incompatible with their survival’.24
Additionally, species may be listed in Appendix II if
they do not fulfil this criterion, but nevertheless require
protection in order to bring international trade in such
species under effective control. Under Article II.3,
parties may apply to list additional species subject to
national protection that require the cooperation of
other parties to restrict trade; such species are so des-
ignated on Appendix III of the convention. With a vast
array of species, sub-species and populations having
been listed on these Appendices over the past forty
years, there is accordingly a strong basis for CITES to
interact with a multitude of multilateral actors in pur-
suing mutual objectives and conservation priorities.
On a practical level, such interaction is undertaken
through the operative institutions of CITES. Upon inau-
guration, most MEAs adopt a broadly similar institu-
tional structure, typically establishing a Conference of
the Parties (COP) as a decision-making body, a Secre-
tariat as an administrative hub and permanent focal
point, alongside a specialist advisory group providing
technical advice to help frame operational priorities.
The general similarity between these structures pro-
vides obvious points of interaction between MEAs. In
the case of CITES, the COP is charged with reviewing
the implementation of the convention, with particular
responsibility for considering amendments to the
Appendices and to improving its effectiveness,25 which
has included the adoption of resolutions and decisions
to promote collaborative activities. The COP has also
established separate specialist committees to provide
scientific and expert technical advice on plants and
animals respectively. The Plants and Animals Commit-
tees have also acted as visible points of contact for
treaty interaction. Alongside a Standing Committee,
which advises the COP on an inter-sessional basis,
20 Stockholm Action Plan, in: Report of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment (UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 16
June 1972), Recommendation 99.
21 As of 12 August 2013. Lebanon is the most recent member, acced-
ing on 26 May 2013.
22 Alongside the CBD and CMS, the cluster further includes the Con-
vention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Water-
fowl Habitat 1971 (Ramsar, 2 February 1971; in force 21 December
1975), the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cul-
tural and Natural Heritage 1972 (Paris, 23 November 1972; in force
17 December 1975) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture 2002 (Rome, 6 June 2002; in
force 29 June 2004).
23 CITES, n. 1 above, Article XIV.3. In practice, this latter position will
apply only to Member States of the European Union (EU), which
implements the provisions of CITES within the common market under
Regulation 338/97/EC of 3 March 1997 on the Protection of Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora by Regulating Trade Therein, [1997] OJ
L61/1. The EU has long sought to accede to CITES, but the 1983
Gaborone amendment to the convention permitting this has not yet
entered into force – having been effectively blocked by the require-
ment of acceptance by at least 54 its members that were full parties
at the material time. The EU institutions have nonetheless bypassed
this tactical obstruction by formulating a pre-agreed collective position
prior to major CITES meetings.
24 CITES, n.1 above, Article II.2.
25 Ibid., Article XI.
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CITESmaintains an active Secretariat which has played
a key role in promoting the convention and its work to
its MEA counterparts. Finally, CITES places a strong
emphasis upon the establishment of national bodies to
implement the convention. Parties are required to des-
ignate national Management Authorities, which are
charged with granting permits and certificates for the
import and export of listed species, alongside Scientific
Authorities to advise on the merits of issuing such
permits.26 These bodies have also played an important
role in promoting coherence between international
commitments at a national level.
Legally, the projected relationship between CITES and
allied multilateral bodies is addressed to a certain
degree within the text of the convention itself. Some
pause for caution is, however, appropriate in this
respect since the rather idiosyncratic wording of these
provisions has had occasional complications for the
treaty’s external relations. Poor drafting of such clauses
in MEAs is by no means confined to CITES.27 However,
its impact is compounded by a lack of overarching nor-
mative principles guiding treaties that are intended –
whether by design or implication – to work
collaboratively.28 The effect of other international
instruments on the convention is addressed in Article
XIV. A rather orthodox conflict clause is advanced in
Article XIV.2, proclaiming that CITES ‘shall in no way’
affect national obligations arising from international
agreements relating to other aspects of trade, taking,
possession or transport of specimens. This has created
relatively little turbulence from the main treaties with
which CITES interacts most frequently. As noted below,
the CBD has generally sought the advice of CITES
where trade and transportation matters are raised,
while the CMS has either expressly advocated a close
engagement with the convention on such issues or oth-
erwise encouraged the parties to apply the lessons
learned through the national implementation of CITES
commitments in regulating trade in species to which
CITES is not applicable.
Friction has arisen predominantly in the case of certain
marine species, however, largely due to the application
of Article XIV.4, which provides that:
A State party to the present Convention, which is also a party
to any other treaty, convention or international agreement
which is in force at the time of the coming into force of the
present Convention and under the provisions of which pro-
tection is afforded to marine species included in Appendix
II, shall be relieved of the obligations imposed on it under
the provisions of the present Convention with respect to
trade in specimens of species included in Appendix II that
are taken by ships registered in that State and in accordance
with the provisions of such other treaty, convention or inter-
national agreement.
This provision raises considerable interpretive chal-
lenges. As Young outlines, it would seemingly address
only those marine-related instruments that were in
existence prior to the conclusion of CITES.29 Moreover,
whether the limited number of fisheries treaties that
survive from the pre-CITES era may be categorically
viewed as advancing the ‘protection’ of marine species
is a matter of some debate.30 It is accordingly difficult to
state definitively how this clause is intended to operate
in practice.
Article XIV.4 has arguably provoked the greatest degree
of unforeseen mischief in the context of commercial
whaling. This has arisen primarily through the actions
of mutual parties seeking to downgrade the protection
afforded to whales under CITES in order to pressurize
the continuing IWC moratorium on commercial
hunting, instituted in 1982. The result has been the
partial displacement of the debate over whale conser-
vation – and its accompanying controversies – into
CITES, much to the discomfort of its Secretariat. Poten-
tial conflicts between CITES and the ICRW were first
considered within the IWC at the time of its conclu-
sion.31 Throughout the early years of the operation of
CITES, the IWC was itself targeting trade concerns to
deter so-called ‘pirate whaling’ and to prevent the emer-
gence of unregulatedmarkets for whale meat.32 Viewing
26 Ibid., Article IX.
27 Article 22 of the CBD, n. 9 above, is perhaps the most notorious
example of the genre, with an insistence upon its incompatibility with
treaties that may ‘cause a serious damage or threat to biodiversity’
creating scope for difficulties in framing its relationship with allied
regimes. See R. Caddell, n. 4 above, at 50–52. This may be particu-
larly acute in the context of marine species. See R. Wolfrum and N.
Matz, ‘The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 4:1 Max Planck
Yearbook of United Nations Law (2000), 445.
28 For an insightful appraisal of the limitations of international treaty
law in this respect, see H. van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation
of International Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection of the
Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’, 44:4 New York University Journal
of International Law and Politics (2011), 1205, at 1243–1255.
29 M.A. Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between
Regimes in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011), at
65–67.
30 Ibid., at 66–67.
31 At the 25th Annual Meeting of the IWC, convened in 1973, the
CITES Technical Committee drew attention to the possibility of ‘con-
flict between decisions taken by the Commission on the taking of
certain species of whales and action taken under the provisions
of this convention on the capture of whales or trading in the products
of such whales’, while individual Commissioners were urged to com-
municate this issue to their governments in order to facilitate reser-
vations to CITES on this basis. See IWC, Twenty-Third Report of the
International Whaling Commission (IWC, 1975), at 33.
32 See IWC Resolution 1976-5, Resolution on Transfer of Vessels,
Equipment and Assistance (25 June 1976); IWC Resolution 1977-8,
Resolution on Prevention of Transfer of Whaling Vessels, etc. (24
June 1977); IWC Resolution on Importation of Whale Products from
Non-IWC Member Countries and Resolution on Transfer of Whaling
Equipment and Expertise, etc. (both Resolutions adopted at a rare
Special Meeting of the IWC, 20 December 1978); IWC Resolution
1979-9; Resolution on Importation of Whale Products from, Export of
Equipment to, and Prohibition of Whaling by Non-Member Countries
(13 July 1979); IWC Resolution 1980-6, Resolution aimed at Discour-
aging Whaling Operations Outside IWC Regulations (26 July 1980).
RECIEL 22 (3) 2013 INTER-TREATY COOPERATION
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
267
the new convention as a potential ally in this regard, in
1976 the IWC offered to act as the official advisor to
CITES on cetaceans.33 Noting the desirability of using
‘each international opportunity to stop the taking and
to ban trade in those species and stocks of whales which
receive total protection’, CITESwas in turn requested to
‘take all possible measures’ to support pertinent IWC
restrictions.34
This invitation was swiftly accepted – and with unex-
pected consequences. Within its first decade of activity,
CITES exerted an unexpected influence over the trajec-
tory of conservation measures within the IWC. Having
listed a number of whale species on its Appendices at a
preliminary stage,35 at its second COP all species of
cetaceans that had not been designated to Appendix I
were listed on Appendix II. At the third COP, and
having previously advocated the ‘maximum protection
possible’ for cetaceans listed in the Appendices,36 the
CITES parties up-listed a number of species to Appen-
dix I. Consequently, commercially exploited whales
then qualified for a greater degree of protection under
CITES than the ICRW.37 This development has been
credited as a contributory factor to the introduction of
the commercial moratorium by the IWC;38 having been
‘outflanked’ by CITES,39 pressure intensified within
the Commission for stronger protective measures. In
response to the adoption of the moratorium on com-
mercial hunting under the ICRW, the remaining com-
mercially harvested species of whales had been added
to Appendix I of CITES at its fourth COP a year later –
a listing that was scheduled to enter into effect concur-
rently with the IWC restrictions.40
Maintaining this heightened degree of protection for
whales subject to the IWC moratorium has long been a
central feature of the interrelationship between CITES
and the ICRW. This arrangement was largely harmoni-
ous until the ninth COP in 1994, at which point appli-
cations to down-list particular whale species from
Appendix I were tabled for the first time.41 Such pro-
posals have been consistently raised and defeated
within CITES in subsequent COPs, accompanied by
trenchant debate between the parties.42 These develop-
ments have caused considerable unease both within the
IWC, which has exhorted its members to refrain from
agitation within alternative fora,43 and CITES, which in
2000 took the unusual step of formally complaining
that the ‘transfer of the IWC debate’ was starting to
‘polarize decision-making’ in the trade convention.44
Such concerns were particularly acute at the fourteenth
COP to CITES in 2007 which, by a quirk of the institu-
tional calendar, was convened back-to-back with a
decidedly attritional IWC Meeting. In response to
further down-listing proposals, a decision was adopted
by the COP, directed at the Animals Committee and
stating that ‘[n]o periodic review of any great whale,
including the fin whale, should occur while the mora-
torium by the International Whaling Commission is in
place’.45 This categorical undertaking accordingly nulli-
fies any future down-listing proposals while the IWC
moratorium on commercial harvesting remains opera-
tional, with CITES now seemingly closed as an avenue
through which to undermine these restrictions.
With overlapping species rendering the phenomenon
of ‘regime-shifting’ something of an occupational
hazard for multilateral bodies – especially in a marine
context, whereby States have proved adept at playing
organizations off against each other46 – the relationship
33 IWC, Twenty-sixth Report of the International Whaling Commission
(IWC, 1978), at 23.
34 Resolution to CITES, adopted at the Special Meeting of the IWC in
1978. Nevertheless, a degree of wariness remained towards the
nascent CITES regime within the IWC at this juncture. See IWC,
Twenty-eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission (IWC,
1980), at 5.
35 In 1975, blue, humpback, grey, right and bowhead whales were
listed on Appendix I, while in 1977 stocks of fin and sei whales were
added to Appendix II. See A. Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining
Issues in International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2005), 337.
36 CITES Resolution Conf. 2.8, Introduction from the Sea (30 March
1979).
37 See A. Gillespie, n. 35 above, 337.
38 P.W. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling: From Conserva-
tion of Whaling to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of Whale-
watching (Oceana, 1985), 405. It should be observed that this was far
from the only motivating factor, however, and that attempts to impose
zero quotas on great whales pre-date the conclusion of CITES.
39 A. D’Amato and S.K. Chopra, ‘Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life’, 85:1 American Journal of International Law (1991), 21, at 43.
40 Under Article XV.1(c), amendments to the CITES Appendices ordi-
narily enter into effect ninety days subsequent to the COP at which
the amendment was accepted. Accordingly, the decision to delay the
entry into effect of these amendments represents a rare departure
from CITES practice.
41 See K. Eldridge, ‘Whale for Sale? New Developments in the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora’, 24:3 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law (1995), 549.
42 C.P. Carlarne, ‘Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: Interna-
tional Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of Interna-
tional Whaling Policies’, 24:1 Virginia Environmental Law Journal
(2005), 1, at 24–28.
43 IWC Resolution 1999-6, Resolution on Cooperation between the
IWC and CITES (28 May 1999); IWC Resolution 2001-5, Resolution
on Commercial Whaling (27 July 2001); IWC Resolution 2007-4,
Resolution on CITES (31 May 2007).
44 Letter from (then) Secretary-General Willem Wijnstekers to the
IWC: reproduced in A. Gillespie, n. 35 above, at 340–341. These
sentiments echo those expressed previously by Japan, urging the
IWC to resolve this issues swiftly ‘otherwise the scientific basis by
which CITES has opted for operating will become frustrated’. See
IWC, Forty-eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission
(IWC, 1998), at 40.
45 CITES Decision 14.81, Great Whales (15 June 2007). These
restrictions seemingly apply only to the lethal exploitation of great
whales: at the sixteenth COP the parties amended CITES Resolution
Conf. 9.6, Trade in Readily Identifiable Parts and Derivatives (5
March 2013), to permit limited trade in ambergris and other lucrative
products derived from sperm whale excretia.
46 See J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Devel-
opment of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011), at
240–241.
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between CITES and the IWC represents a cautionary
tale for the perils of forum shopping.47 Relations
have improved in recent years, although doubts have
been expressed whether the two organizations can
co-exist harmoniously, given the heavy politicization
of the whaling issue.48 For its part, CITES has repeat-
edly pledged support for a strong collaborative
relationship with the IWC,49 which has in turn been
reciprocated.50 Pointedly, however, while acknowledg-
ing the scientific pre-eminence of the ICRW regime,51
CITES has consistently maintained that the trade in
whale products ‘cannot be controlled effectively by
the IWC alone’.52 Obvious areas of mutual activity
would include the enforcement of trade restrictions,
which the IWC has targeted in isolation as a key aspect
of future reforms,53 whereas CITES has extensive
experience in establishing and operating DNA registries
and in training customs officials. However, largely
due to concerns over the limits of their respective
remits, the development of a more coherent and coor-
dinated programme of mutual activity between CITES
and the IWC remains a seemingly distant prospect at
present.
The difficulties experienced between CITES and the
IWC highlight the utility of elaborating clear and mutu-
ally agreed lines of cooperation and activity between
multilateral bodies. Increasingly, and echoing a trend
set by the CBD, most MEAs have loosely forma-
lized their external relations through a network of
non-binding agreements, typically in the form of
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).54 This is
perhaps the most tangible way in which secretariats
fulfil their treaty-derived obligations to facilitate dia-
logue with allied bodies. The precise legal foundation
for the conclusion of such instruments is not always
obvious, since few of the more longstanding environ-
mental treaties had prescribed a formal position on this
issue. The CITES Secretariat has ‘assumed’ that it has
the power to do so55 and there appears to have been
little objection to this assertion. Convincing arguments
have also been advanced as to the entitlement of MEAs
to rely on the doctrine of implied powers,56 which would
seemingly strengthen this assumption. Ultimately,
while doubts have been raised as to whether this legal
mandate legitimately resides in the CITES Secretariat
or (as is more likely) within its COP,57 the practical
utility of such agreements appears to outweigh any
technical objections that might be expressed through a
strict application of international treaty law.
In recent years, CITES has adopted a series of MOUs
with allied institutions. The gestation of such instru-
ments has not always been straightforward, especially
in a marine context. The relationship between the trade
convention and fisheries bodies, for instance, has been
complicated by concerns that the listing of certain fish
species on CITES – potentially at the instigation of
parties far removed from its practical impact upon the
fishery – may undermine the operation of carefully
negotiated quotas and management principles. Indeed,
the development of an MOU with the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was particu-
larly tortuous, requiring multiple drafts and ultimately
entering into effect only with the concession of FAO
involvement in the CITES listing process.58 Previous
attempts to cooperate with fisheries regulators had
proved complicated in the context of Patagonian
toothfish, with strong concerns raised over the implica-
tions of CITES involvement within CCAMLR.59 Beyond
the marine sphere, however, CITES has successfully
targeted a cooperative working relationship with the
International Tropical Timber Organization,60 as well
as fellow biodiversity treaties.
47 On this issue, see especially A. Gillespie, ‘Forum Shopping in
International Environmental Law: The IWC, CITES and the Manage-
ment of Cetaceans’, 33:1 Ocean Development and International Law
(2002), 17.
48 D.R. Rothwell and T. Stephens, The International Law of the Sea
(Hart, 2010), at 472.
49 CITES Resolution Conf. 2.7, Relationship with the International
Whaling Commission (30 March 1979); CITES Resolution Conf. 3.13,
Trade in Whale Products (8 March 1981); CITES Resolution Conf.
9.12, Illegal Trade in Whale Meat (18 November 1994); CITES Reso-
lution Conf. 11.4, Conservation of Cetaceans, Trade in Cetacean
Specimens and the Relationship with the International Whaling
Commission (20 April 2000).
50 IWC Resolution 1994-7, Resolution on International Trade in Whale
Meat and Products (27 May 1994); IWC Resolution 1995-6, Resolu-
tion on Improving Mechanisms to Prevent Illegal Trade in Whale Meat
(2 June 1995); IWC Resolution 1996-3, Resolution on Improving
Mechanisms to Restrict Trade and Prevent Illegal Trade in Whale
Meat (28 June 1996); IWC Resolution 1999-6, n. 43 above; IWC
Resolution 2007-4, n. 43 above.
51 Most recently, CITES has recognized ‘the IWC’s Scientific Com-
mittee as the universally recognised international institution with inter-
national expertise to review and evaluate the status of the world’s
whale stocks’. See IWC Resolution 2007-4, n. 43 above.
52 CITES Resolution Conf. 2.9, Trade in Certain Species and Stocks
of Whales Protected by the International Whaling Commission from
Commercial Whaling (30 March 1979); CITES Conf. Resolution 11.4,
n. 49 above.
53 IWC, Sixty-second Report of the International Whaling Commission
(IWC, 2010), at 61.
54 For an appraisal of this trend in a biodiversity context, see R.
Caddell, n. 4 above, at 62–68.
55 Legal Personality of the Convention and the Secretariat (SC54
Doc. 8, 2006).
56 See especially R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, n. 3 above, at 655.
57 See M.A. Young, n. 29 above, at 156–158.
58 For a highly illuminating account of this issue and its practical and
legal implications, see ibid., at 154–188.
59 On this issue see L. Little and M. Orellana, ‘Can CITES Play a Role
in Solving the Problem of IUU Fishing? The Trouble with Patagonian
Toothfish’, 15:1 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law
and Policy (2004), 21. A truce was ultimately brokered with CCAMLR.
See CITES Resolution Conf. 12.4, Cooperation between CITES and
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources Regarding Trade in Toothfish (15 November 2002).
60 CITES Resolution Conf. 14.4, Cooperation between CITES and
ITTO Regarding Trade in Tropical Timber (15 June 2007).
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CITES remains committed to promoting collaborative
working arrangements with appropriate multilateral
bodies. In the context of biodiversity, the COP recently
reiterated its faith in effective inter-treaty cooperation
to enhance the coherent implementation of interna-
tional commitments at a national level.61 Likewise, as a
key component of its Strategic Vision for the years
2008–2013, the COP undertook to ‘contribute to sig-
nificantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by
ensuring that CITES and othermultilateral instruments
and processes are coherent and mutually supportive’.62
To this end, Objective 3.5 of the CITES Strategic Vision
calls upon the parties and Secretariat to cooperate ‘as
appropriate’ with other relevant bodies dealing with
natural resources ‘in order to achieve a coherent and
collaborative approach to species which can be endan-
gered by unsustainable trade, including those which
are commercially exploited’. In implementing this
objective, CITES has identified a series of clusters
through which cooperative efforts should be coordi-
nated, including biodiversity-related and other nature
conservation conventions, international environmental
organizations, natural resources bodies, international
trade and development organizations, international
law enforcement agencies and international financial
mechanisms.63 The pursuit of these objectives remains
ongoing, with the fundamental components of the Stra-
tegic Vision recently extended to 2020.64 On biodiver-
sity issues, cooperative work has been prioritized with
the CBD and the CMS, to which this article now turns.
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE
CBD AND CITES
The CBD remains the most widely ratified and themati-
cally diverse of all MEAs adopted to date. Following a
lengthy gestation under the United Nations umbrella, it
was concluded at the UN Conference on Environment
and Development in 1992. The CBD currently boasts
193 parties and, famously, one signatory, in the form of
the United States.65 Operationally, the CBD bears little
resemblance to CITES and the CMS. It contains no
Appendices upon which particular species may be des-
ignated for priority activities. It instead operates on a
more thematic basis, identifying cross-cutting issues
upon which to foster multilateral cooperation.66 The
CBD has, however, developed a strong institutional
structure, encompassing a COP that is charged, inter
alia, with developing ‘appropriate forms of coopera-
tion’ with the executive bodies of similar bodies.67 The
COP is supported by a proactive Secretariat, with a clear
mandate ‘to coordinate with other relevant bodies’68
and to represent the COP in establishing linkages at an
executive level with allied regimes.69 Core technical
institutions have also been established in the form of
the Subsidiary Body of Scientific, Technical and Tech-
nological Advice (SBSTTA), alongside a Clearing-House
Mechanism ‘to promote and facilitate technical and
scientific cooperation’.70
The CBD is a lengthy document, establishing a broad
framework to pursue its three core objectives, articu-
lated in a rather unwieldy fashion as constituting
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources,
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into
account all rights over those resources and to technologies,
and by appropriate funding.71
In contrast, CITES is less ostensibly ecological in
outlook and, beyond information-sharing and broad
gestures of solidarity with other actors, has considered
its role in addressing global environmental problems to
be more tangential.72 Interactions with the CBD have
thus been framed in this context. As CITES exhibits
fewer thematic overlaps with this regime than other
CBD partners, synergy arrangements have largely
advanced in a less formalized manner.
A productive working relationship was envisaged by
both treaties at a preliminary stage. A Memorandum
of Cooperation (MOC) was adopted in 1996, pledging
institutional cooperation and information exchange,
alongside the mooted coordination of work pro-
grammes (especially concerning reporting consider-
ations) and encouraging joint conservation actions.
61 CITES Resolution Conf. 16.4, Cooperation of CITES with Other
Biodiversity-related Conventions (14 March 2013).
62 CITES, Resolution Conf. 14.2, CITES Strategic Vision 2008–2013
(15 June 2007), Goal 3.
63 Cooperation with Other Organizations – Overview (SC61 Doc.
15.1, 2011).
64 CITES, Resolution Conf. 16.3, CITES Strategic Vision: 2008–2020
(14 March 2013).
65 As of 3 June 2013.
66 On the operation of the CBD generally, see M. Bowman, P. Davies
and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011), at 587–628. On current operational directions,
see E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow:
Looking Afresh at the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 21:1 Year-
book of International Environmental Law (2010), 3.
67 CBD, n. 9 above, Article 23.4. Relationships with ‘other interna-
tional agreements, institutions and processes of relevance’ have
been a standing item of activity for the CBD since the first COP. See
CBD Decision I/9, Medium-term Programme of Work of the Confer-
ence of the Parties (9 December 1994). The rationale for such
arrangements has altered little since it was articulated at the second
COP ‘to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities and costs on the
part of Parties and of the organs of the Convention’. CBD Decision
II/13, Cooperation with Other Biodiversity-related Conventions (17
November 1995).
68 CBD, n. 9 above. Article 24(d).
69 Ibid., Article 23.4(h).
70 Ibid., Article 18.3.
71 Ibid., Article 1.
72 Synergy with Biodiversity-related International Initiatives (CoP15
Doc.10.1, 2010), at 4.
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Shortly afterwards, CITES adopted a Resolution
framing its relationship with the CBD in relatively
vague terms, suggesting that parties streamline activi-
ties between national focal points and encouraging
partnership opportunities between the conventions.73
In 2000 the MOC was amended to include an option to
develop joint work plans ‘from time to time’. Only one
such initiative has been elaborated, encompassing the
years 2000–2002. This involved cooperation on eco-
nomic incentives, green labelling and sharing case
studies, alongside more targeted action on plant con-
servation and bushmeat concerns.
Thus far, interactions between the CBD and CITES have
proved comparatively limited in scope and outcome.
Unlike the CMS and Ramsar Convention, CITES has
not been formally appointed a ‘lead partner’ to the CBD
on issues within its specialized focus, nor have any sub-
sequent work plans been officially adopted. Nonethe-
less, important partnerships have been developed on an
executive level, with CITES having been a core member
of the CBD’s Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG) since its
inception in 2004.74 The BLG provides a forum for
executive staff to elaborate overarching policy priorities
and identify further potential grounds for institutional
synergies. Although hampered in the past by structural
shortcomings,75 considerable improvements have been
made in recent years and the BLG provides a platform
to foster a common ethos between its participants.
Despite some initial reservations,76 CITES has orien-
tated itself towards the pursuit of the overarching bio-
diversity loss goals adopted by the CBD. To this end,
having pledged to ‘contribute to significantly reducing
the rate of biodiversity loss by ensuring that CITES and
other multilateral instruments and processes are coher-
ent and mutually supportive’,77 its Strategic Vision was
revised in the light of the 10th COP to the CBD, to work
towards the reformulated Aichi targets.78 Although
arguably inspired as much by the prospect of access
to additional revenue streams through the Global
Environment Facility for future projects, this develop-
ment has been warmly welcomed by the CBD parties79
and provides a unified objective between the
Biodiversity-related Conventions in discharging their
respective mandates. This may further bolster scientific
cooperation, given that the work of the Chairs of the
Scientific Advisory Boards of Biodiversity-related Con-
ventions (CSAB), within which CITES is an active and
valued participant, is intended to increasingly mirror
that of the BLG,80 for which the pursuit of the Aichi
targets remains a central objective.
Given its specific focus on regulating trade, the collab-
orative role of CITES is most commonly sought in a
technical context. Since most MEAs lack effective com-
pliance procedures and have limited enforcement roles,
the experience of CITES is considered an invaluable
guide by strategic partners in framing law enforcement
policies and priorities. Although a number of effective
partnership programmes have been developed, caution
has nonetheless been advised in viewing CITES assis-
tance as a panacea for enforcement concerns. Although
sharing materials and examples of best practice are
effective training tools to inform considerations on the
ground, the very nature of law enforcement activities
mean that proposed inter-treaty collaborations need
to be clearly focused and involve personnel whose
duties are engaged under both CITES and the partner
regime.81 Considerable scope for effective collaboration
to promote law enforcement activities is nonetheless
provided by the International Consortium on Combat-
ing Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), within which CITES plays
a key role. Established in 2010, the ICCWC has under-
taken extensive advisory activities and has assisted in
advancing wildlife crime provisions in a number of
multilateral initiatives to date. Drawing on this exper-
tise, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has
73 CITES Resolution Conf. 10.4, Cooperation and Synergy with the
Convention on Biological Diversity (20 June 1997). On the early
scope for cooperation, see R. Cooney, ‘CITES and the CBD: Ten-
sions and Synergies’, 10:3 Review of European Community and
International Environmental Law (2001), 259.
74 CBD Decision VII/26, Cooperation with Other Conventions and
International Organizations and Initiatives (20 February 2004).
75 On the operation of the BLG, see R. Caddell, n. 4 above, at 57–61.
76 CITES has voiced concerns within the BLG over the general expec-
tation to expend considerable resources in measuring performance
towards what are effectively CBD priorities, which were formulated
without the involvement of the other Secretariats. Report of the Fifth
Meeting of the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-Related Conventions
(BLG-5-Rep-Final, 14 September 2006) (‘BLG-5 Report’), at 2; and
Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-
related Conventions, Document (BLG-6-Rep-Final, 31 May 2008),
at 4.
77 CITES Resolution Conf. 14.2, n. 62 above, Goal 3.
78 CITES Resolution Conf. 16.3, n. 64 above.
79 CBD Decision XI/6, Cooperation with Other Conventions, Interna-
tional Organizations and Initiatives (19 October 2012). The CBD had
previously undertaken to strengthen administrative synergies with
CITES ‘to develop working arrangements that promote the coherent
and mutually supportive implementation of the two conventions and
their respective strategies’. CBD Decision X/20, Cooperation with
Other Conventions and International Organizations and Initiatives
(29 October 2010).
80 Report of the Fourth Meeting of Chairs of Scientific Advisory Bodies
of Biodiversity-related Conventions (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/CSAB/4/2,
25 May 2011), at 9.
81 Personal communication with John M. Sellar OBE, former Chief of
Enforcement Assistance of CITES (on file with the author). Sellar
cites the difficulties raised by coordinating training activities pursuant
to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Green
Customs initiative, where personnel based at ports would commonly
encounter violations of international commitments concerning waste
and dangerous cargoes, while those at airports were more likely to be
faced with wildlife crime. Developing a homogenous approach to
MEA compliance was therefore counter-productive. On the value of
CITES enforcement experiences, see P.H. Sand, ‘Enforcing CITES:
The Rise and Fall of Trade Sanctions’, 22:3 Review of European,
Comparative and International Environmental Law (2013), 251.
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developed an analytic toolkit on forest crime,82 which
is likely to be used by a host of MEAs in framing
implementation and enforcement policies in this
context.
Forest considerations present clear opportunities for
cooperation, with both conventions strongly engaged
on this theme. CITES has sought policy synergies in
respect of great apes, especially regarding in situ con-
servation,83 which may be pursued by CBD through its
forest and protected areas strategies. Most tangibly,
linkages have been formed to regulate the trade in
bushmeat – a key concern for CITES for which it has
pledged to cooperate with the CBD.84 In 2000, CITES
established a Bushmeat Working Group, although
progress was seemingly stymied by a lack of species
designations on the CITES Appendices. In 2004, CITES
identified poaching as ‘the greatest threat’ to the sur-
vival of a number of iconic species and called upon a
number of bodies, including the CBD, to recognize their
important supporting role in international conserva-
tion efforts.85 Meanwhile, having previously established
its own Liaison Group on Bushmeat,86 a clear forum for
inter-agency dialogue was established under the CBD,
which has recently reiterated its desire to work closely
with CITES.87 In June 2011, the CBD Group organized a
joint meeting with the Central African Bushmeat
Working Group that had been established in 2004 by
CITES, resulting in an extensive series of recommenda-
tions to be taken individually and in partnership to
address bushmeat considerations.88 Significantly, these
arrangements have provided a platform to re-energize
the CITES Working Group – a stagnating forum that
had failed to report to the Standing Committee in over
three years.89
Specific cooperation between the two conventions is
confined to a small number of issues of common
concern. The CBD has consistently acknowledged the
need for collaborative practices on invasive species,90
while CITES has also sought to explore synergies in this
regard.91 The CBD has recognized that: ‘Parties should
view their responsibilities for addressing invasive alien
species not only from their perspective as importers,
but also from their perspective as exporters.’92 While
fulfilling specific CBD commitments,93 this also clearly
engages the work of CITES. In 2008, a mandate was
established for an Inter-Agency Liaison Group on
Invasive Alien Species,94 with the CITES Secretariat
formally requested to join as part of its ongoing coop-
eration with the CBD. CITES has targeted improve-
ments to its transportation policies95 and e-commerce
practices as its key contribution to the Liaison Group in
the immediate short-term.96 CITES was also identified
as a key partner in addressing invasive species through
its regulation of the trade in exotic pet animals.97 Again,
the value of CITES in providing guidance on best prac-
tices concerning enforcement has been endorsed by the
CBD in this context, which further considers that the
implementation of CITES Resolution 13.10 by mutual
parties ‘will contribute to the implementation of Article
8(h)’.98 Questions remain over the future role of CITES
in this regard, however: at the most recent meeting of
the Liaison Group, the Secretariat stated that it ‘did not
have a strongmandate’ concerning this issue, but would
remain supportive of this forum ‘[f]or the time being’.99
CITES is also deemed an important component in the
CBD’s Global Strategy for Plant Conservation (GSPC),
with the MOC expressly revised to provide a more
targeted remit for the trade convention. Following the
82 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Wildlife and Forest
Crime Analytic Toolkit (United Nations, 2012).
83 CITES Resolution Conf. 13.4, Conservation of and Trade in Great
Apes (14 October 2004). As noted below, great ape conservation
provides clear opportunities to collaborate with the CMS.
84 CITES Decisions 14.73 and 14.74, Bushmeat (15 June
2007).
85 CITES Resolution Conf. 13.11, Bushmeat (14 October 2004).
86 CBD Decision VI/22, Forest Biological Diversity (19 April
2002).
87 CBD Decision XI/25, Sustainable Use of Biodiversity:
Bushmeat and Sustainable Wildlife Management (19 October
2012).
88 Revised Recommendations of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity Liaison Group on Bushmeat in Report of the Eleventh Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, 5 December 2012), at 238.
‘Close cooperation’ is required between the CBD and CITES in this
regard. See ibid., Recommendation 16.
89 Outcomes of the Joint Meeting of the CBD Liaison Group on
Bushmeat and the CITES Central Africa Bushmeat Working Group
(UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/LG-Bushmeat/2/4, 4 July 2011), at 4.
90 CBD Decision VI/23: Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems,
Habitats or Species (19 April 2002); CBD Decision VII/13, Alien
Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species (Article 8 (h))
(20 February 2004).
91 CITES Resolution Conf. 13.10, Trade in Alien Invasive Species
(14 October 2004).
92 Report of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Gaps and Incon-
sistencies in the International Regulatory Framework in Relation to
Invasive Alien Species (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/11/INF/4, 17
June 2005), at 7.
93 Especially CBD, n. 9 above, Article 3, which while guaranteeing the
sovereign rights of parties to exploit their own resources establishes
‘the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’; and ibid., Article 8(h),
which requires parties to ‘prevent the introduction of, control or eradi-
cate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or
species’.
94 CBD Decision IX/4, In-depth Review of Ongoing Work on Alien
Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species (30 May
2008).
95 CITES Decision 15.59, Transport of Live Specimens (25 March
2010).
96 Report of the Second Meeting of the Inter-agency Liaison Group
on Invasive Alien Species (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/LG-IAS/2/3, 19
September 2011).
97 CBD Decision X/38, Invasive Alien Species (29 October 2010).
98 CBD Decision XI/28, Invasive Alien Species (19 October 2012).
99 Report of the Third Meeting of the Inter-agency Liaison Group on
Invasive Alien Species (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/LG-IAS/3/2, 13 July
2012), at 2.
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expiry of the CBD-CITES work plan, the CITES Plants
Committee has explored further synergies with the
CBD, establishing a working group to improve linkages
with the GSPC. A mandate for further collaboration has
been established,100 while the Plants Committee has
framed its mid-term planning with reference to GSPC
concerns, culminating in a revised list of activities to
contribute to the CBD initiative during 2011–2020.101
This was endorsed at the most recent COP to CITES,
which recognized ‘the significant role that CITES can
play in the achievement of the objectives and targets of
the GSPC, and the effect upon CITES if the GSPC is
successfully implemented’.102
Beyond these practical initiatives, synergy activities
between the CBD and CITES are most likely to focus
upon developing a more coordinated and cohesive
implementation of multilateral commitments at the
national level. The CBD has elaborated guiding prin-
ciples for the sustainable use of biodiversity103 and,
despite some initial reservations,104 CITES has assisted
in developing operational guidance for their implemen-
tation.105 Likewise, there is a degree of support among
some mutual parties for closer alignment with CBD-
centred access and benefit-sharing (ABS) issues within
domestic CITES procedures, especially among develop-
ing States. While previous unilateral attempts to
impose such criteria within national CITES permits
were considered to be of dubious legality,106 ABS con-
siderations were raised as a draft resolution at the fif-
teenth COP.107 While ultimately defeated, this issue
appears likely to be developed further at future COPs.
Perhaps more significantly, and in line with the Aichi
Targets, CITES has sought to improve synergies on a
national level by assisting the parties in integrating
complementary activities within the National Biodiver-
sity Species Action Plans (NBSAPs) required under the
CBD.108 Echoing a trend in CBD-CMS interactions, in
May 2011 draft guidelines were commended to the
parties,109 which will be trialled and developed further
by the national Management Authorities in the coming
triennium. The precise impact of this initiative, as well
as the projected management commitments on the part
of CITES, remain somewhat uncertain and the effect of
such synergies is unlikely to be accurately quantifiable
for some considerable time. Facilitating the alignment
of multilateral commitments within national strategies
arguably represents a more tangible and valuable form
of inter-treaty cooperation than executive meetings and
dialogues between sundry working groups, especially
from the perspective of domestic nature conservation
agencies that ultimately shoulder the main burden of
treaty congestion. It should be observed however that,
whatever the operational merits of this approach, its
eventual successes are ultimately contingent upon the
capacity, resources and competence of national bodies
to facilitate such initiatives.
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE
CMS AND CITES
Migratory species are acutely vulnerable to anthropo-
genic pressures and, due to their consistent and regular
patterns of transboundarymovements, are in particular
need of multi-jurisdictional efforts to address their con-
servation status. As with CITES, the genesis of a
‘broadly based convention’ to promote the conservation
and management needs of migratory species lay at the
UNCHE. In June 1979 the CMS was duly concluded,
entering into force in 1983.
The CMS advances a unique operational structure that,
alongside prescribing general conservation policies for
migratory species, also provides for the development of
region- and species-specific subsidiary instruments
under its auspices.110 Accession to these subsidi-
aries does not require membership of the CMS. These
instruments may mirror the parent convention in
100 Most recently through CITES Decision 15.91, Working Group on
Mahogany and Other Neotropical Timber Species (25 March 2010).
101 Cooperation with Advisory Bodies of other Biodiversity-related
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (PC19 Doc.8.4, 2011), at
Annex 1.
102 CITES Resolution Conf. 16.5, Cooperation with the Global Strat-
egy for Plant Conservation of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(14 March 2013).
103 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity; Annexed to CBD Decision VII/12, Sustainable Use (20
February 2004).
104 The Animals and Plants Committees observed that it is ‘evident’
that the Principles ‘are not always immediately applicable to the
decision-making process under CITES’, warning of ‘possible compli-
cations’ in using the socioeconomic basis of these Principles in
no-detriment findings and that ‘not all principles were of relevance’ to
the trade convention. CITES Resolution Conf. 13.2, Sustainable Use
of Biodiversity: Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (14 October
2004), at Annex 2.
105 CITES has developed an interactive CD-ROM addressing the
implementation of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines, which
have been commended as a useful operational tool. See BLG-5
Report, n. 76 above, at 1.
106 F. Bloch, ‘The “Brazilian Clause”: A Recent Attempt to Create
Linkages between the CBD and CITES’, 10:3 Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law (2001), 268, at 270.
107 See further E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of
Benefit Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods’,
19:2 Review of European Community and International Environmen-
tal Law (2010) 150, at 164–165.
108 CITES Notification to the Parties No. 2011/021, CITES and
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans under the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (24 February 2011).
109 CITES, Contributing to the Development, Review, Updating and
Revision of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
(NBSAPs): A Draft Guide for CITES Parties (CITES, 2011); CITES
Notification to Parties No. 2011/026, CITES Parties and National
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans under the Convention on
Biological Diversity – A Draft Guide (4 May 2011).
110 On the structure and operation of the CMS generally, see M.
Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, n. 66 above, 535–583; and R.
Caddell, ‘International Law and the Protection of Migratory Wildlife:
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formal structure or, as exemplified below in the context
of saiga antelopes, are increasingly developed as non-
binding MOUs. The coordination of multilateral efforts
to address migratory species therefore involves engage-
ment with both the parent convention and an eclectic
flock of self-contained subsidiaries. The governance of
migratory species has traditionally extended well
beyond the confines of the CMS regime,111 and numer-
ous thematic partnerships with other MEAs and pro-
cesses have been forged in recent years.112 CITES and
the CMS have a long-established basis for interaction
and have pursued a series of mutual activities in recent
years. A host of species listed on the CITES Appendices
have also received attention within the CMS. There is
accordingly clear scope for both treaties to cooperate,
both on a general level to improve institutional prac-
tices and, in specific contexts, to ensure effective
coordination of conservation efforts regarding mutual
species.
The CMS has consistently sought to improve linkages
with ‘existing wildlife conventions’.113 Strengthening
institutional cooperation has also been a key consider-
ation in current114 and ongoing strategic planning.115
Formal interactions date from 1999, when the CMS Sci-
entific Council sought to establish ‘close working coop-
erative arrangements on matters of common interest’
with other technical bodies, inviting, inter alia, relevant
CITES bodies to participate as permanent observers to
its meetings.116 Relations between the two bodies were
formalized through an MOU adopted in 2002, pledging
to ensure policy compatibility, mutual representation at
meetings, data exchange and a commitment to liaise
annually to determine joint activities. This was clarified
further by CITES in 2004,117 which identified an array of
priority species for which conservation activities under
both treaties should mutually reinforce. While a
number of subsequent CMS instruments have expressly
observed the value of CITES listing in future conserva-
tion initiatives,118 joint activities between the two bodies
have centred on the cohort of species identified by
CITES Resolution 13.3 – namely saiga antelopes, snow
leopards, African elephants, marine turtles, whale and
great white sharks and sturgeons.
A first suite of Joint Activities was agreed for 2005–
2007, which focused on improving institutional prac-
tices and identifying commonalities in species coverage
– an unexpectedly complicated task given increasingly
apparent taxonomic and population discrepancies
between the two conventions. A more targeted List of
Joint Activities was developed for 2008–2010, subse-
quently extended into 2011119 and latterly to 2014. The
current programme engages four broad areas of activ-
ity, including outreach and capacity building and
administrative cooperation alongside, more tangibly,
harmonizing nomenclature and joint activities for
the species identified in CITES Resolution 13.3. The
nomenclature project seeks to harmonize species cov-
erage and taxonomic understanding between the two
An Appraisal of Twenty-five Years of the Bonn Convention’, 16:1
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy
(2005), 113, at 119–126.
111 See N. Matz, ‘Chaos or Coherence? Implementing and Enforcing
the Conservation on Migratory Species through Various Legal Instru-
ments’, 65:2 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und
Völkerrecht (2005), 197.
112 On the scope for interactions between the CMS and CBD, see L.
Glowka, ‘Complementarities between the Convention on Migratory
Species and the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 3:3 Journal of
International Wildlife Law and Policy (2000), 205. For an insightful
appraisal of climate change synergy initiatives, see A. Trouwborst,
‘Transboundary Wildlife Conservation in A Changing Climate: Adap-
tation of the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species and Its Daughter
Instruments to Climate Change’, 4:3 Diversity (2012), 258. On the
relationship between the CMS and the EU, see R. Caddell, ‘Biodiver-
sity Loss and the Prospects for International Cooperation: EU Law
and the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals’, 8:1
Yearbook of European Environmental Law (2008), 218.
113 This was first advanced as an institutional priority in 1994. See
CMS Resolution 4.4, Strategy for the Future Development of the
Convention (11 June 1994).
114 CMS Resolution 8.2, CMS Strategic Plan 2006–2011 (25 Novem-
ber 2005). The Strategic Plan was later executively extended without
amendment until the end of 2014.
115 CMS Resolution 10.5, CMS Strategic Plan 2015–2023 (25 Novem-
ber 2011). The maintenance of ‘key partnerships and other support-
ing delivery frameworks, (including those of other Conventions)’ is
intended to continue as a core element in implementing the new
Strategic Plan in due course. See CMS, The Strategic Plan for Migra-
tory Species 2015–2023: Draft Skeleton for Consultation (April
2013), found at: <http://www.cites.org/eng/notif/2013/E-Notif-2013
-015A.pdf>.
116 CMS Resolution 6.7, Institutional Arrangements: Scientific Council
(16 November 1999).
117 CITES Resolution Conf. 13.3, Cooperation and Synergy with the
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
(CMS) (14 October 2004). The MOU is appended to the Resolution.
118 See the preambles to the Memorandum of Understanding con-
cerning Conservation Measures for Marine Turtles of the Atlantic
Coast of Africa (Bonn, 1 July 1999; in force 1 July 1999) (‘African
Turtles MOU’); Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation
and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the Indian
Ocean and South-East Asia (Manila, 23 June 2001; in force 1 Sep-
tember 2001) (‘IOSEA’); Memorandum of Understanding concerning
Conservation Measures for West African Populations of the African
Elephant (Loxodonta africana) (Bonn, 22 November 2005; in force 22
November 2005) (‘West-African Elephant MOU’); Memorandum of
Understanding concerning Conservation, Restoration and Sustain-
able Use of the Saiga Antelope (Saiga spp.) (Bonn, 23 November
2005; in force 24 September 2006) (‘Saiga MOU’); Memorandum of
Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Dugongs
(Dugong dugon) and their Habitats throughout their Range (Abu
Dhabi, 31 October 2007; in force 31 October 2007); Memorandum of
Understanding concerning the Conservation of the Manatee and
Small Cetaceans of Western Africa and Macaronesia (Lomé, 3
October 2008; in force 3 October 2008); Memorandum of Under-
standing of the Conservation of Migratory Sharks (Manila, 12 Febru-
ary 2010; in force 1 March 2010) (‘Migratory Sharks MOU’); and the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Argentine Republic and
the Republic of Chile on the Conservation of the South Andean
Huemul (Plata del Mar, 4 December 2010; in force 4 December
2010).
119 Summary Record of the Fifty-ninth Meeting of the Standing Com-
mittee to CITES (SC59 Doc. 6, 2010), at 2–3.
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conventions – a problem first observed by CITES in
2000.120 Cooperative activities have been ongoing at a
technical level, both between the two conventions and
on a wider basis between the Biodiversity-related Con-
ventions. Taking its lead from CITES, the CMS has
adopted a list of standard nomenclature,121 with both
conventions pledging continuing cooperation on this
issue.
Most significantly, however, joint species activities have
exemplified the scope for productive synergies between
the two conventions. Interactions for snow leopard con-
servation have occurred primarily on a scientific basis,
although the CMS has listed this species for Concerted
Action, both individually122 and within its wider policies
on Central Eurasian Aridlands.123 Support for further
research activities on snow leopards has also been
forthcoming under the CMS Small Grants Programme,
most recently in April 2013 in Tajikistan with a view
towards developing cross-border cooperation on both
habitats and trade-related issues.124 CITES has also
called for ‘bold and innovative actions based on a sound
base of information’ for snow leopards.125 Future syner-
gies would thereby appear to involve the CMS address-
ing habitat considerations, developing action plans and
providing data within the context of its Central Eur-
asian Aridland Mammals Initiative, with CITES regu-
lating trade and enforcement issues.
Synergies for marine turtle conservation have been
relatively limited, although both CMS turtle subsidiar-
ies clearly view CITES as a key partner in managing
these species.126 Cooperative practices have been
limited to encouraging parties to join CITES and imple-
ment these commitments effectively, while the trade
convention has focused largely on freshwater turtles127
and interacted more ostensibly with the FAO. As far as
sturgeons are concerned, CITES has concentrated pri-
marily on the caviar trade. CITES has, however,
appealed for its parties to develop action plans and
regional agreements for this species,128 for which the
CMS would appear to be especially well placed to play a
future supporting role. Likewise, efforts to conserve
sharks under the CMS have long envisaged CITES
involvement,129 with the Migratory Sharks MOU noting
engagement with, inter alia, CITES as a ‘fundamental
principle’.130 CITES participated at the final drafting
meeting for this instrument, which entered into force in
2010 and remains in its relative infancy, and has
pledged cooperation for the three species of shark that
are listed both under the trade convention and the
MOU. Ultimately this may prove to be the most useful
contribution by CITES in this respect, given that the
trade in sharks appears to be predominantly localized
and therefore lacks the international element required
to formally trigger CITES obligations, as identified
during joint discussions with the FAO.131 Nonetheless,
the national institutions established pursuant to CITES
provide an experienced and effective framework
through which concerns over the domestic trade in
shark products may be further addressed.
Thus far, examples of closest synergies from a species
perspective can be seen in saiga and elephant initia-
tives. The saiga antelope is predominantly threatened
by a combination of habitat erosion and lucrative
poaching activities, which have long engaged the con-
cerns of both conventions. The Saiga MOU, formalized
by the CMS in 2006, envisages a central implementa-
tion role for CITES, noting that poaching and illegal
trade are significant contributory factors in the decline
of this species. Moreover, reporting requirements
under the MOU are framed with specific reference to
both CITES and the CMS132 – a unique position within
CMS subsidiaries and one that clearly envisages future
operational synergies. CITES has emphasized the need
to implement the MOU and its work programme to its
parties133 and pledged to cooperate with the CMS on
issues pertaining to the saiga antelope.134 Cooperation
has indeed been a hallmark of the MOU’s practices to
date, with its two Meetings of the Signatories having
been jointly organized and financed by the CMS and
120 CITES Resolution Conf. 12.11, Standard Nomenclature (15
November 2002).
121 CMS Recommendation 9.4, Standardized Nomenclature for the
CMS Appendices (5 December 2008).
122 CMS Resolution 7.1, Concerted Actions for Appendix I Species
(24 September 2002).
123 CMS Recommendation 9.3, Tigers and Other Asian Big Cats
(5 December 2008).
124 CMS, ‘Project of the Month: Supporting Tajikistan in
Transboundary Cooperation on Snow Leopards’ (1 April 2013),
found at: <http://www.cms.int/news/PRESS/nwPR2013/04_apr/nw
_020413_snowleopard.html>.
125 CITES Resolution Conf. 12.5, Conservation of and Trade in Tigers
and Other Appendix-I Asian Big Cat Species (15 November 2002).
126 Objective 5.1 of IOSEA, n. 118 above, requires parties to address
trade concerns, which includes encouraging States to become parties
to CITES and to facilitate better compliance with CITES through
enhanced training, legislative improvements and effective monitoring
programmes. The African Turtles MOU, n. 118 above, is less explicit,
but has considered mutual participation by its signatories in other
MEAs, expressly including CITES, to be a high priority. See ibid.,
Objective 4.3 of the Conservation Plan.
127 CITES Resolution Conf. 11.9, Conservation of and Trade in Tor-
toises and Freshwater Turtles (20 April 2000).
128 CITES Resolution Conf. 12.7, Conservation of and Trade in
Sturgeons and Paddlefish (15 November 2002).
129 CMS Resolution 8.16, Migratory Sharks (25 November 2005).
130 Migratory Sharks MOU, n. 118 above, at Section 3. Such bodies
are also invited to assist in the implementation of the MOU on the
basis of their technical and administrative capacity. Ibid. at Section 6.
131 FAO, Report of the FAO/CITES Workshop to Review the Applica-
tion and Effectiveness of International Regulatory Measures for the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Elasmobranchs (FAO, 2012),
at 22.
132 Saiga MOU, n. 118 above, at paragraph 6.
133 CITES Decisions 14.91 and 14.93, Saiga Antelope (15 June
2007).
134 CITES Decision 16.95, Saiga Antelope (Saiga tatarica) (14 March
2013).
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CITES, alongside a significant joint workshop convened
in association with the Chinese CITES authorities.135
The Saiga MOU simultaneously demonstrates the ben-
efits of close interactions between MEAs, as well as the
difficulties encountered where the range of species
addressed by one convention may not identically match
those listed on another. Exemplifying the benefits of
mutual priorities between treaties, Kazakhstan – a vital
range State in multilateral efforts to promote saiga con-
servation – initially proved reluctant to accede to this
instrument until a degree of pressure to this end was
applied through CITES.136 Participation in the MOU
subsequently appears to have inspired the Kazakh
authorities to strengthen domestic legislation and to
bolster anti-poaching activities.137 On the other hand,
practical challenges to inter-treaty coordination swiftly
became apparent, as the MOU reflected CMS designa-
tions at the material time and initially applied to only
one of the two sub-species of saiga antelope, the Saiga
tatarica tatarica. This marginalized Mongolia, a key
habitat State and importer of saiga products, since the
Saiga tatarica mongolica, which is native only to
western Mongolia, was not covered by the MOU.138 The
CITES Appendix II listing applied to the full range of
saiga species, hence these discrepancies in scope threat-
ened to undermine the MOU’s operational consistency.
In the meantime, Mongolia had been urged by CITES to
implement aspects of theMOU that were relevant to the
conservation of its saiga populations, but the CMS posi-
tion nonetheless precluded it from full participation.139
In September 2010 the MOU was amended to incorpo-
rate the full range of saiga populations, integratingMon-
golia more fully into the MOU and introducing greater
coherence to cross-treaty efforts to protect this species.
The new Mid-term International Work Programme for
the Saiga Antelope thereforemandates a series of activi-
ties familiar to the work of both conventions and also
offers opportunities in the longer-term to engage with
CBD concerns, including commitments towards inte-
grating saiga conservation plans into NBSAPs.
Despite these promising initiatives, problems have
been subsequently encountered in their implementa-
tion. At the sixteenth COP to CITES it was lamented
that none of the range States to the Saiga MOU had
submitted the required biennial reports. It was there-
fore not possible to assess progress towardsmeeting the
objectives of this instrument, or identify where the core
challenges to implementation may accordingly lie.140
Consequently, and with the CITES Secretariat lacking
the mandate and resources to assess the progress of
conservation initiatives,141 joint activities have instead
been restricted to the sharing of CITES training
manuals, broad commitments to applying the experi-
ence of law enforcement processes to assist in themoni-
toring of poaching and an undertaking to work with the
CMS to source funding for the Third Meeting of the
Signatories to the MOU.142 Beyond these activities, it
appears that the primary role of CITES in addressing
saiga concerns will be to reinforce national institutions,
customs and law enforcement agencies within the
countries concerned to address, inter alia, the trade in
saiga derivatives on a domestic and transboundary
basis.
Meanwhile, ongoing work to protect African elephants
remains ‘the major part of the two Conventions’ col-
laboration’.143 Elephants have constituted the most
iconic aspect of CITES activities to date, as well as an
enduring source of friction across its faultlines of
trade and conservation. In 2005, the CMS adopted an
MOU on Western African Populations of the African
Elephant, which recognized that implementing CITES
commitments will form an integral part of conservation
efforts under this instrument.144 CITES has established
two leading systems to address elephant concerns –
Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) and
the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) –
which, while primarily focused onmonitoring trade and
hunting, also seek to support management and protec-
tion policies.145 These programmes generate substantial
volumes of data that not only advance CITES objectives,
but may also be harvested by other bodies, with the
research regularly contributing to the work of other
MEAs.146 Close cooperation has been envisaged with
these CITES groups since the inception of the Elephant
MOU. CITES-MIKE has agreed to act as a regional
coordinator of the MOU’s focal points, drawing on its
previous experience and thereby preventing a costly
duplication of administrative efforts within these
135 CMS, Workshop on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Saiga Antelope (29 September 2010), found at: <http://www.cms.int/
news/PRESS/nwPR2010/10_oct/Saiga_WorkShop_Urumqi_FINAL
_REPORT_English.pdf>.
136 Questionnaire submitted by the Saiga MOU to Phase One of the
Working Group on the CMS Future Shape Process (on file with
author).
137 See R. Caddell, n. 4 above, at 66–67.
138 Report of the Second Meeting of the Signatories to the Memoran-
dum of Understanding concerning Conservation, Restoration and
Sustainable Use of the Saiga Antelope (UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/SA-2/
REPORT, 2010), at 4.
139 CITES Decision 13:30, Saiga Antelope (12 October 2004; subse-
quently repealed). Concurrently, the CMS had recognized that
‘similar measures to those foreseen for Saiga tatarica tatarica could
be applied to Saiga tatarica mongolica, and invites Mongolia to con-
sider applying them’. Extension of the Memorandum’s Taxonomic
and Geographical Scope (UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/SA-2/Doc/8, 25
August 2010), at 1.
140 Saiga Antelope (CoP 16 Doc. 56, 2013), at 3.
141 Ibid., at 3.
142 Ibid.
143 Report of the Thirty-seventh Meeting of the Standing Committee to
the CMS (CMS, 2010), at 13.
144 West-African Elephant MOU, n. 118 above, preamble.
145 CITES, Resolution Conf. 10.10, Trade in Elephant Species (25
November 2011).
146 Personal communication with John M. Sellar OBE, n. 81 above.
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regions.147 BothMeetings of the Signatories convened to
date have been attended by CITES-MIKE and have
been followed immediately by joint meetings of the two
bodies to ascertain future cooperation. A series of
important allied policies have emerged from these
meetings. In June 2008, a workshop organized by the
CMS during the Pan-African CITES-MIKE Meeting
resulted in a programme of activity for transboundary
areas within a number ofmutual parties, for which clear
partnership roles for conservation efforts were estab-
lished.148 Specific roles for both treaties are also demar-
cated within the MOU’s Medium-term International
Work Programme, while future areas of cooperation
include broader conservation measures, continued
attention to the transboundary activities programme
and ongoing training of personnel.149
Future species-based cooperation appears likely to con-
tinue in the same vein, with CITES envisaging an
expansion of joint activities to fur seals, dugongs and
vicuña.150 The CMS Dugong MOU has identified a stra-
tegic role for CITES and interactions may therefore
follow a similar model to the saiga and elephant pro-
grammes. Fur seals and vicuña are not as yet subject to
distinct subsidiary instruments under the CMS,
although they are frequently addressed by its Scientific
Council. Cooperation with CITES is accordingly most
likely to continue on a primarily technical basis, with
the CMS monitoring of habitat-related considerations
generating data that can provide a clearer basis to
assess the impact of trade-related measures. In turn,
the CMS has highlighted cetaceans as a key area of
future cooperation with other actors, including a
prominent role for CITES.151 A coordinated programme
of activity is currently being developed for themid-term
future, which is intended to demarcate supervisory
responsibilities and bring a degree of order to multilat-
eral activities that have long been acutely affected by
the challenges of treaty congestion.
Future species-based cooperation between CITES and
the CMS is more ambiguous for two main reasons.
First, their species overlap is deceptively limited, espe-
cially concerning species considered an operational pri-
ority under the CMS. This is particularly pronounced in
the context of birds. The Agreement on the Conserva-
tion of Albatrosses and Petrels,152 for instance, provides
an express foundation for cooperation153 alongside def-
erence to CITES in relation to the trade in eggs and
derivatives,154 yet ultimately there is little commonality
in species coverage between the two instruments. Like-
wise, the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement,155
which applies to a vast range of species, would appear
well placed to advance cooperative activities: the Secre-
tariat is required to consult ‘on a regular basis’ with,
inter alia, CITES,156 which has also been formally des-
ignated as one of the Agreement’s Communication
Partners,157 while clear commitments are prescribed in
respect of trade in endangered species.158 However, only
four AEWA species have been listed on CITES Appen-
dix I,159 with overlapping designations on Appendix II
similarly limited.160 Avian cooperation could be devel-
oped further in the context of birds of prey, however –
there is substantial overlap between the falcons and
owls listed on the CITES Appendices and the applica-
tion of the MOU on Migratory Birds of Prey in Africa
and Eurasia.161 There is a mandate to advance synergies
with MEAs ‘that achieve or otherwise assist the aims,
147 MOU Coordination (UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/WAE2/Doc.7, 2011),
at 3.
148 Workshop on the African Elephant (UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/WAE.1/
Inf.6, 19 March 2009), at 3.
149 CMS, Second Joint Meeting of the CMS-MoU/CITES-MIKE, pro-
visional agenda, found at: <http://www.cms.int/species/elephants/
MIKE_Meeting_docs/Niger_20June2011/Provisional_Agenda
_E.pdf>.
150 Cooperation with Other Organisations: Convention on the Conser-
vation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (SC61 Doc. 15.4 (Rev.
1), 2011), at 2.
151 CMS Resolution 10.15, Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans
(25 November 2011).
152 Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (Cape
Town, 2 February 2001; in force 1 February 2004) (‘ACAP’).
153 The ACAP Secretariat is to liaise with other bodies ‘whose activi-
ties are directly or indirectly relevant to the conservation, including the
protection and management, of albatrosses and petrels’, which would
include CITES. Ibid., Article X(d).
154 Under Paragraph 1.1.1 of the ACAP Action Plan, appended to
the Agreement, and found at: <http://www.cms.int/species/acap/
acap_ap.htm>, parties are to prohibit trade in albatrosses and petrels
without prejudice to any obligations they have under CITES. Excep-
tions to this prohibition are possible ‘[e]xcept for provisions made for
species under CITES’. Ibid., Paragraph 1.1.2.
155 African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (The Hague, 16 June
1995; in force 1 November 1999) (‘AEWA’).
156 Ibid., Article IX. On the scope for inter-treaty cooperation through
AEWA, see R. Adam, ‘Waterbirds, the 2010 Biodiversity Target, and
Beyond: AEWA’s Contribution to Global Biodiversity Governance’,
38:1 Environmental Law (2008), 87, at 112–129.
157 G. Van Boven, AEWA Communication Strategy (AEWA, 2005),
at 7.
158 Paragraph 2.1.1.(c) of the AEWA Action Plan, appended to
the Agreement, found at: <http://www.unep-aewa.org/documents/
agreement_text/eng/2012-2015/aewa_agreement_text_2013_2015
_annex3_only.pdf>. Moreover, every State party to AEWA is also a
member of CITES, following the recent Lebanese accession to the
trade convention. The sole exception remains the EU which, while an
active participant in AEWA, cannot currently accede to CITES.
159 Namely the Slender-billed Curlew (Numenius tenuirostrus),
Waldrapp (Geronticus eremite), Siberian Crane (Grus lecogeranus)
and Dalmatian Penguin (Pelecanus crispus). The Slender-billed
Curlew and Siberian Crane are also subject to distinct MOUs estab-
lished under the auspices of the CMS.
160 These species are the White-headed Duck (Oxyura
leucocephelia), Comb Duck (Sarkidiornis melanotes), Shorebill
(Balaeniceps rex), Black Stork (Ciconia nigra), Eurasian Spoonbill
(Platalea leucorodia) and African Penguin (Splensiscus dermasus).
Additionally all species of Flamingos are listed on CITES Appendix II;
AEWA applies to the Greater Flamingo (Phocoenicopertus ruber) and
Lesser Flamingo (Phocoenicopertus minor). The CMS has also
established a distinct MOU on High Andean Flamingos.
161 Memorandum of Understanding on Migratory Birds of Prey in
Africa and Eurasia (Abu Dhabi, 22 October 2008; in force 1 Novem-
ber 2008).
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objectives and activities’ with this MOU,162 alongside
scope for CITES to be appointed a formal ‘Cooperating
Partner’.163 In the short-term, potential synergies will
be seemingly focused on particular species of raptors.
In January 2012, the CMS established a Sakar Falcon
Task Force with the ultimate aim of developing a Global
Action Plan and monitoring system for this species,
with CITES accorded an opportunity to participate in
this process.
Second, where such overlaps do exist, trade consider-
ations may not ultimately provide a fertile source of
cooperative activities. Trade in such species may be
purely domestic and therefore not officially subject to
CITES activity. Indeed, AEWA has conducted an exten-
sive review of trade164 affecting the waterbirds under its
purview, concluding that activities within the Agree-
ment Area are overwhelmingly concentrated on a local-
ized basis involving non-CITES species.165 Likewise, for
mutual species, trade considerations may be a lesser
priority for the CMS and its subsidiaries than other
habitat-based threats. This is the case under ACAP,
which has prioritized by-catch mitigation in its coop-
erative arrangements to date,166 while trade aspects
have been given a lesser priority in the Single Species
Action Plans elaborated under AEWA.167 Similarly, the
trade in marine mammals is largely prohibited under
other CMS subsidiaries, hence synergies with other
bodies have been prioritized over CITES. Recent
concerns over the transfer of a captive orca168 received
minimal attention within the Agreement on the Conser-
vation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North-East
Atlantic, Irish and North Seas 1992 (ASCOBANS),169
which appears poorly placed to consider trade issues.170
The transfer of cetaceans – which has provoked strong
debate within CITES171 – has also been raised within the
ACCOBAMS.172 The ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee
has expressed concerns over the surreptitious replace-
ment of deceased captive cetaceans with individuals
from depleted wild stocks173 – an issue that was seem-
ingly intended to have been brought before CITES at its
recent COP.174 Likewise, despite a number of overlap-
ping bat species, minimal attention has been given to
trade considerations under EUROBATS.175 This issue
notwithstanding, in many respects CITES has already
made a strong contribution to conservation efforts
under the CMS. Although interactions concerning par-
ticular species may beminimal – and even if the trade is
exclusively domestic – the institutional machinery
established and experience gained by national authori-
ties in implementing their CITES commitments stand
162 Paragraph 6 of the MOU’s Action Plan, appended to the MOU,
found at: <http://www.cms.int/species/raptors/MoU_&_AP/Eng/
Annex_3_Action_Plan_E.pdf>.
163 Cooperating Partners (CMS/Raptors/MoS1/Doc.13.4, 28 Novem-
ber 2012), found at: <http://www.cms.int/species/raptors/MoS_Mtgs/
mos1_2012/doc_13_04_coop_partners_e.pdf>.The implications of
Cooperating Partner status are, however, rather ambiguous: such
actors ‘may associate themselves’ with the MOU, but there has been
little further elaboration of this role.
164 ‘Trade’ is not defined under AEWA and is seemingly interpreted as
corresponding to domestic trade. This appears to be due to practical
reasons – trade in AEWA species is essentially localized, while the
requirement under AEWA, n. 155 above, Article IX, to liaise with
CITES suggests that the trade convention is intended to act informally
as a guide on international issues.
165 AEWA, Review on Hunting and Trade Legislation in Countries
Relating to the Species Listed in Annex 2 to the African-Eurasian
Waterbird Agreement (AEWA, 2007), at 32–46.
166 On the current state of cooperation between ACAP and other
bodies, see ACAP, Development of Agreements with Other
Organisations (MOP4 Doc. 15 Rev 1, 2012). ACAP has prioritized the
elaboration of MOUs and joint activities with regional fisheries man-
agement organisations – most notably CCAMLR. The proposed
involvement of CITES in by-catch orientated collaborative arrange-
ments has not generally been welcomed by fisheries actors. See R.
Boardman, The International Politics of Bird Conservation: Biodiver-
sity, Regionalism and Global Governance (Edward Elgar, 2006), at
195–199.
167 For example, the Draft International Single Species Action Plan for
the White-headed Duck (AEWA/MOP/3.22, 26 September 2005),
found at: <http://www.unep-aewa.org/meetings/en/mop/mop3_docs/
pdf-docs/mop3_22_white_headed_duck_ssap.pdf>, at 59, considers
trade to be a ‘Medium Priority’.
168 This incident involved the transfer of ‘Morgan’, a wild killer whale
rescued in a poor physical condition and subsequently nursed back to
full health, by one party (The Netherlands) to a non-party (Spain),
although the legitimacy of this process has been strongly disputed.
See A. Trouwborst, R. Caddell and E. Couzens, ‘To Free or Not To
Free: State Obligations and the Rescue and Release of Marine
Mammals. A Case Study of “Morgan the Orca” ’, 2:1 Transnational
Environmental Law (2013), 117.
169 Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic,
North-East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas (Bonn, 17 March 1992; in
force 29 March 1994).
170 See A. Trouwborst, R. Caddell and E. Couzens, n. 168 above, at
129–133.
171 See S.J. Fisher and R.R. Reeves, ‘Global Trade in Live Ceta-
ceans: Implications for Conservation’, 8:4 Journal of International
Wildlife Law and Policy (2005), 315. In 2008, concerns over the trade
in live specimens prompted an Israeli submission (later withdrawn) for
the Solomon Islands population of Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins to
be included in the CITES review of significant trade, to introduce
stronger controls over exports from a population with a highly uncer-
tain numerical and conservation status. See Selection of the Solomon
Islands Population of Tursiops Aduncus for Inclusion in the Review of
Significant Trade (AC23 Doc. 8.5.1, 19 April 2008). See further
E.C.M. Parsons, N.A. Rose and T.M. Telecky, ‘The Trade in Live
Indo-Pacific Bottlenose Dolphins from Solomon Islands: A CITES
Decision Implementation Case Study’, 34:3 Marine Policy (2010),
384.
172 ACCOBAMS, n. 11 above.
173 ACCOBAMS Recommendation SC 8.2, Recommendation
Addressing the Continued Live Removals of Bottlenose Dolphins in
the Black Sea (15 November 2012). See A. Trouwborst, R. Caddell
and E. Couzens, n. 168 above, at 133–134.
174 This issue, largely confined to the Black Sea, should have been
referred to the sixteenth COP to CITES, but the requisite documen-
tation had not been prepared in time. See ACCOBAMS, Report of
the Eighth Meeting of the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee
(ACCOBAMS, 2012), at 25–26. This issue could be pursued by the
Council of Europe – a case file pursuant to the Convention on the
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 1979 (Bern,
19 September 1979; in force 1 June 1982) is under consideration.
175 Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats
(London, 4 December 1991; in force 16 January 1994).
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them in good stead to address trade-related problems
on the more localized level engaged under the CMS.
In the mid-term, the clearest examples of synergies
between CITES and the CMS are likely to be technical in
nature. The vast array of scientific groups established
under the CMS and its subsidiaries generate consider-
able volumes of data that can support decision making
within CITES. On a central level, the CMS has priori-
tized activities to address infectious diseases in the light
of the H5N1 Avian Influenza outbreak in 2005, which
impacted heavily on migratory birds. In the light of
effective inter-treaty cooperation to address Avian
Influenza,176 the CMS-sponsored Scientific Task Force
on Wildlife and Ecosystem Health was established to
mitigate future mortality events,177 within which a
prominent role is envisaged for CITES.178 This may
lead to increased interaction with AEWA, which has
acknowledged that the illegal trade and transportation
of wild birds represents a significant means of spread-
ing the H5N1 virus.179 As with the CBD, the expertise of
CITES in addressing non-native species has also been
recognized.180 A mutually cooperative data-sharing
arrangement is currently being fostered in the context
of gorillas, with CITES having played an active part in
the meetings of the Agreement on the Conservation of
Gorillas and Their Habitats181 and viewing this instru-
ment as a means of identifying the main jurisdictions
through which the ICCWC ought to prioritize protective
measures. Indeed, the MOU may assist in raising
awareness of trade-related problems, which has been
highlighted as a significant problem for law enforce-
ment operations.182 CITES has also welcomed advice
from the Gorilla Agreement in further developing law
enforcement training materials183 and, for its part, has a
long history of cooperating with a variety of actors to
address gorilla-related crime.184 The possibility of
CITES-MIKE being extended to gorillas has also been
raised, amid concerns that budget limitations preclude
the effective monitoring of habitats and law enforce-
ment considerations under the CMS.185 Most tangibly,
CITES is in a position to share examples of best practice
and training on law enforcement issues, thereby assist-
ing significantly with the practical implementation of
the various CMS species initiatives on the ground.186
Accordingly, in implementing commitments towards
data-sharing, the key practical challenge for inter-
treaty synergies involves marshalling the vast streams
of data garnered under the auspices of the CMS to
enable decisions on the impact of trade to be accurately
taken within CITES, and for expertise on law enforce-
ment and trade monitoring to be efficiently distributed
within the various structures and subsidiaries of the
CMS.
CONCLUSIONS
Inter-treaty cooperation remains a significant opera-
tional priority for virtually all MEAs in the mid- to long-
term future. This is especially true in a biodiversity
context, in which the normative landscape is one of
multiple actors often seeking to address broadly similar
issues of concern. CITES has actively engaged with
allied biodiversity MEAs, most significantly with the
CBD and CMS. To this end there have been a series of
qualified successes. CITES has proved to be an invalu-
able source of technical advice and assistance on issues
and species of common concern. Reciprocally, allied
MEAs have furnished CITES with essential scientific
data to assist in decision making under its structures. A
degree of administrative streamlining is emerging, par-
ticularly in an African context and within initiatives
that can scarcely afford the luxury of operative wastage.
The precise role of CITES in particular projects has
been more clearly demarcated. The participation of
CITES in certain initiatives has raised the political vis-
ibility of individual species, which has also had a
176 See R. Cromie et al., ‘Responding to Emerging Challenges: Mul-
tilateral Environmental Agreements and Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza H5N1’, 14:3–4 Journal of International Wildlife Law and
Policy (2011), 206.
177 CMS Resolution 10:22, Wildlife Disease and Migratory Species
(25 November 2011). The Task Force was ultimately developed in
unison with the FAO.
178 CITES currently participates as a ‘Partner’, unlike the CBD, which
is a ‘Core Affiliate’. Birds remain the key concern within this forum, but
a number of issues are of interest to CITES – not least the decimation
of saiga antelope stocks through an outbreak of pasteurellosis in May
2010, while bushmeat concerns have also been identified as a Pri-
ority Area.
179 AEWA Report of the Third Meeting of the Parties to AEWA
(AEWA, 2005), 10. Mitigating the impact of the virus remains a core
priority for AEWA, which has played a prominent role in synergy
arrangements to address avian diseases in concert with the CMS and
the Ramsar Convention. See R. Caddell, n. 4 above, at 67.
180 AEWA, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to AEWA
(AEWA, 2008), 20.
181 Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats
(Paris, 26 October 2007; in force 1 June 2008). As with AEWA, the
Secretariat of the Gorilla Agreement is expressly required to consult,
inter alia, with CITES, Ibid., Article IX(a). Likewise, under Article
III.2(d), one of the key obligations prescribed under the agreement is
to coordinate efforts to eradicate activities related to poaching.
182 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n. 82 above, at
165.
183 Report of the First Meeting of the Technical Committee (UN Doc.
UNEP/CMS/GOR-TC1/Report, 2011), at 5.
184 Personal communication with John M. Sellar OBE, n. 81 above.
185 Report of the First Meeting of the Technical Committee, n. 183
above, at 4.
186 For instance, the essential role of CITES in this manner has been
endorsed strongly by the Gorilla Agreement (which adopted Resolu-
tion 2.1, Cooperation and Information Sharing for Improved Wildlife
Law Enforcement, 27 November 2011) and by the West-African
Elephant MOU (according law enforcement capacity building a ‘Very
High’ priority within its Medium Term International Work Programme
concerning Conservation Measures for the West African Populations
of the African Elephant (Loxodonta africana) 2012–2014 (UN Doc.
UNEP/CMS/WAE2/Doc.8, 16 June 2011)).
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discernible effect upon regulatory attitudes on the
ground. There has been a move towards facilitating a
more effective streamlining of multilateral commit-
ments at a national level. Perhaps most significantly,
the national institutions established pursuant to CITES
– and their experience in implementing the convention
– offer a clear scope to address crime and trade issues
advanced under other MEAs that lack the expertise to
offer effective multilateral oversight of these concerns
and where CITES obligations are not technically
engaged.
Operative shortcomings have also been apparent,
however. Although numerous points of mutual inter-
est can be identified, active cooperation is either forth-
coming or still at a preliminary or superficial stage.
Synergies also tend to be most apparent at an execu-
tive level or between disembodied and disparate
working groups. Species overlaps between CITES and
allied MEAs are deceptively limited – and a laborious
task to identify – which may render interaction with
CITES a lower priority than other regimes. CITES has
also proved to be a problematic partner in a marine
context, with prospective suitors wary of the potential
impact of species listings upon settled management
measures and processes. Laudable attempts to
improve national synergies remain fundamentally
contingent upon the resources and coherence of
domestic nature conservation structures. Likewise,
wider problems of dovetailing disparate administra-
tive processes, conservation priorities and institutional
ethos between MEAs remain.
Inter-treaty synergy remains an attractive managerial
mantra, not least in a straitened economic climate. Yet
such cooperation remains deceptively expensive in
termsof humanand financial resources, especially given
that many MEAs have experienced a net loss of staff in
recent years and additional investment in monitoring
suchprogrammes– althoughnecessary for their success
– is not always an attractive proposition for parties.187 As
pressure intensifies on MEAs to adopt closer working
relationships with each other, the experience of CITES
suggests that cooperative programmes that build clearly
on the proven expertise and operational capacity of the
partner on a limited range of species and themes seem-
ingly presents the most effective model for treaty inter-
action in the biodiversity context.
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187 States are, however, prepared to invest significantly on an ad hoc
basis. For instance, France recently donated €95,000 to underwrite
the costs of identifying future areas of synergy between CITES
and the CBD. See Cooperation with Other Organisations: Convention
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (SC61 15.4
(Rev. 1), 2011), at 2.
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